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SPIRIT is an interdisciplinary doctoral school for the systematic study of themes and 
theoretical issues related to the intertwining of political , transnational and intercultural 
processes in the contemporary world. It is dedicated to examining - from the combined 
vantagepoint ofboth the human and the social sciences - cultural, political and communica-
tive issues on a spectrum ranging from the local dimension over the national and the 
regional to the processes of globalisation that increasingly impinge on the organisation of 
life and the structure and dynamics of the world. The thematic issues range from questions 
of European identity and integration; over transnational processes of migration, subcultures 
and international marketing; to transatlantic problems or nationalism and religion in Eastern 
Europe or the USA What ties them together within the framework of SPIRIT is the 
school 's distinctive features : Analysing themes in the context of the meanings and 
implications of internationality, and taking culturaVcornrnunicative as well as politi-
cal/sociological aspects into account. Considerable emphasis is placed on Europe - its 
history, politics, social anthropology, place in the world, relations to global issues, and 
trajectories fo r the future . On this background research is conducted within four thematic 
areas: 
1_ Studies of Identity, Mentality and Culture 
2_ Intercultural Cooperation in International Markets and Organisations 
3 _ Migration, Spatial Change and the Globalisation of Cultures 
4_ Internationa l Politics and Culture 
An Alternative to Canada? 
A Comparative Analysis of the Development of Regionalism in Scotland 
and the Atlantic Provinces of Canada. 1 
Robert Chr. Thomsen 
Department of English, Aarhus University 
The ongoing debate on globalisation, transnationalism and the assumed effect on the 
continued existence of the nation state as the principal way of organising the world has once 
again brought up issues such as nationalism, regionalism and separatism. Some of the 
nation states that seem to have been influenced the most by new developments in the areas 
of communication, economic co-operation etc., and which have therefore come into the 
searchlight of scholars in pursuit of these' -isms ' or movements, are Canada and Great 
Britain. This paper is a contribution to the understanding of the effects of the developments 
that these nation states are going through. 
Whether economic and cultural globalisation is a supporter or a destroyer of nation states 
and national identities as we know them is presently the subject of much scholarly debate. 
As this paper focuses more specifically on some of the consequences of current 
developments for certain societies it will not include a theoretical discussion about the 
effects of globalisation in general. Suffice it here to say that if one assumes, as two 
premises in a logical line of argument, that both the amount of power and the amount of 
loyalty towards collective, social, imagined communities are constants, clearly the old idea 
of the nation state seems to be losing out in favour of the supra-national entity (above) and 
the regionllocal community (below). Or, at least, finding itself in a process of becoming a 
much less sacred, more questioned idea than it used to be. That conclusion may of course 
be based on false premises. This line of argument will not have a direct effect on the 
analysis or the conclusions drawn in the following. but it may be worth keeping in mind.' 
This article is based on a paper presented at the Nordic Association for Canadian Studies annual 
conference, Aarhus University. 8 November 1997. 
For a full account of the debate on the impact of globalisation up until now, see Ulf Hedetoft: The 
Nation State Meets the World: National Identities in the Context ojTransnationality and Cultural 
Globalisatioll, Discussion Paper No.2!97. SPIRlr/Cenler for International Studies. Aalborg 1997, and 
The case of Scottish nationalism, which has equally become a popular subject of study, will 
be the point of departure in this paper, the object of which will be regionalism in the 
Atlantic Provinces of Canada (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick). 
It seems that whenever the unity crisis in Canada is debated, the recurring topic is almost 
always Quebec separatism. Since British Columbia senator Pat Carney made her rather 
controversial remarks about British Columbia's possibility of using for its own advantage 
the threat of separatism in negotiating decentralisation with the federal Canadian 
government, there has also been a renewed focus on separatism in the Western Provinces.) 
In the unity debate , however, the Atlantic Provinces are usually just touched very briefly. 
F()r some reason in-depth analyses of possible Atlantic Canadian responses to Canadian 
national unity are hardly ever offered.' One cannot help wonder why: perhaps the political 
regionalism that used to be so strong in the 1920s with the Maritime Rights Movement was 
actually the last indication that this region wanted an increased say in its own affairs? This 
paper sets out to investigate the Atlantic region and its apparent 'lack' of present-day 
regionalism. 
DEFINING THE CONCEPTS 
Usually, a prerequisite of analysing and discussing regionalism and nationalism is defining 
these very concepts . Too often these concepts are confused and used interchangeably with 
little consideration given to the conceptual misunderstandings that this may cause. 
'Nationalism' , however, wi ll be mentioned only in passing, meaning that an account of the 
Linda Weiss: Globalisation alld the Myth of the Powerless State, in: New Left Review, no .225, 
Sept.lOct . 1997. 
Inter Alia 'Carney's musings on B.C. seoaration embarrass Tories ' , The Halifax Herald Limited, 26. 
Exceptions do exist, tho ugh. They would include Robert Finbow: Atlantic Canada: Forgotten 
Periphery in an Endangered Confederation? In: Kenneth McRoberts (ed.): Beyond Quebec, Taking 
Stock of Canada. McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal 1995; P.G. Cornell: The Maritimes and 
The Atlantic Region both in: William Kilbourn (ed.): Canada - Unity in Diversity. Holt, Rhinhart and 
Winston of Canada, Limited, T oronto, 1967; K.A. MacKirdy, 1.5. Moir and Y.F. Zoltvany: Changing 
Pers pectives in Canadian History. Selected Problems (rev. ed.). 1.M. Dent & Sons (Canada) Limited, 
Toronto, 1971 ; Ralph R . Kruger: A Geographical Perspective: The Setting and the Settlement in: 
William M etcalfe (ed.): Understanding Canada. A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies. 
New York Uni versity Press, New York and London, 1982. 
uses (and misuses) of the concept will be beyond the scope of this paper, and therefore will 
not be provideds 
In the following, the recurring concept will be 'regionalism' , hence an account of the use 
of it. In order to clarify the lise of 'regionalism' in this context, first a definition of'regioll' 
is needed: at least three different types of geographical/territorial regions exist: regions of 
states (e.g. Eastern Enrope, the Balkans), regions between states (e.g. Euroregion 
Schleswig, the Alps) and regions within states (e.g. Western Australia, the Bihar Province 
of India). This paper will deal mainly with the last understanding of the concept - pJacing 
Scotland as one region within Great Britain, and the Atlantic Provinces as one region with.in 
Canada. 
With the latter definition of region as a point of departure, an imperfect but still useful 
definition of 'regionalism' would be: The active political attempts on the part of a region 
to obtain a decentralisation of powers from the state to the region. 
With the risk of offending readers with a Scottish national consciousness, in the following, 
when such political attempts are dealt with - in Atlantic Canada and Scotland - they will 
be referred to as regionalism. This is mainly for the sake of comparison and the 
standardisation of the concepts used. A standardisation of the concepts has been chosen in 
order not to confuse different concepts (such as nation state and nation). Such a decision 
can be easily defended if one accepts that regionalism is to be found - in different more or 
less radical versions - between two poles on a scale: cultural sub-nationalism· at one errd 
and full-blown separatist nationalism at the other. In this case, any Scottish nationalist will 
be able to define his '- ism' as both a nationalist and a regionalist phenomenon, accepting, 
at least theoretically, that hislher nation is also a region (within the British state). 
In order to explain properly the development that seems to have characterised tbe 
relationship between regions and the state in which they find themselves in this new era of 
globaJisation, and an attendant new phenomenon closely related to regionalism as defined 
above, it is necessary to introduce a new concept. This new phenomenon is not confined 
to a few societies; in the post-cold war, post-modem era, there seems to be a general 
tendency towards nation states losing their sacredness and a tendency towards political and 
socio-economic considerations Jaying the ground for new loyalties towards either supra-
For further reading on the subject is referred to John Hutchinson and AD. Smith's contribution to the 
Oxford Readers series: Nationalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. 
As defined by Tom Nairn (Nairn, 1977: 155). 
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national entities (such as the EU) or regions. I suggest that in relation to loyalty towards the 
region, the result of this development be labelled 'pragmatic regionalism' . Such pragmatic 
regionalisms need not, as is the case with 'orthodox' nationalisms (at least in a Gellnerian 
definition of it), have as their final goal the total independence of the region, the complete 
congruence between region and state.' The wishes of pragmatic regionalists would be 
slightly less radical - usually an improved say in the internal affairs of the region, combined 
with an accept of the existence of and diminished role played by the present ill: an 
alternative state - but with the option and possibility of developing separatist demands if 
this is deemed necessary. 
ATLANTIC CANADA AND SCOTLAND - WHY DO A COMPARATIVE? 
When social , economic and cultural characteristics of the Atlantic Provinces of Canada are 
considered , it soon becomes apparent how much Atlantic Canada resembles another region 
in the North Atlantic: Scotland.s A list of major common characteristics would include: 
socia-economic reasons for joining the unions they are now part of,9 the existence of 
cuI tural sub-nationalism at some points in the history of the region, the re-invention of 
tradition, a traditional industry which is in decline, a popular preoccupation with the 
standard of social welfare, dependence on state subsidies and the recent development of 
new industries partially changing the focus from the primary to the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. At a more subjective level of argumentation, it could be asserted that both regions 
constitutionally, politically, economically and socially have been 'in bed with an 
elephant'.10 In other words, both regions have suffered from being the smaller partner trying 
to co-operate with a larger, not always responsive, one_ The following is a brief presentation 
of each of these common characteristics. 
Gellner, t 993: I . 
If one considers the political, economic, social and cultural characteristics of Greenland, Iceland, the 
Faroes, Scotland and Atlantic Canada, it becomes clear that there is a high degree of similarity 
between these societies - it actually makes sense to speak of a INorth Atlantic Crescent' of regions 
which resemble each other closely . 
Canada and Great Britain are of course two different types of union - Canada a federal state, Great 
Britain a constitutional monarchy. Still. in a noC too strictly constitutional meaning. it still makes sense 
to refer (0 both as a union of smaller entities - be they defined as provinces, nations or regions. 
Therefore, again for the sake of comparison, both Canada and Great Britain will be referred to as 
unions. 
The title of a pamphlet published by the Sal tire Society of Scotland, 1985 in which P.H. Scott argues 
that Scotland has gained very little from being part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain (Scott, 
1985). 
" 
12 
These societies were all brought into their respective unions (Scotland 1707, Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick 1867, Prince Edward Island 1873 and Newfoundland 1949) by a 
political and economic elite who had an eye to the economic advantages that membership 
of the union would bring to the region and to themselves. Also, these societies had 
accumulated huge debts that the new union offered to assume. Thus. these unions where 
marriages of convenience - not love. Therefore, in most cases the result was that large parts 
of the population were demonstrating against this unification and popular movements were 
trying to have the acts of union repealed. Another probable reason for the popular 
discontent might be the fact that. with the exception of Newfoundland politicians, the elites 
saw no need to ask the people about this decision through referendums or other democratic 
measures. 
In investigating the history of Scotland and Atlantic Canada, one also finds that both 
regions developed what Tom Nairn in the now famous The Break-Up ill' Britain (1977) in 
the case of Scotland refers to as 'cultural sub-nationalism' ." Because Scotland soon came 
to prosper from being part of the British Empire, the political and economic elite fought 
hard to prevent a mature political nationalism from coming into existence - they simply 
could not afford a separatist movement . But. at the same time Scotland and the Scottish 
elite could not help being affected by the general ideas prevailing during the 'Age of 
Nationalism', in fact they contributed many of them; so, according to Nairn, a 'stunted, 
caricatural version' of nationalism was produced - one which was safe and harmless from 
a unionist's point of view but repressive and destructive from a nationalist's point of view.'2 
In Scotland this was done mainly by romantic-minded literati such as James Macpherson 
and Walter Scott who invented and re-invented, respectively, the romantic and sentimental 
image of Scotland as populated by red-bearded, Claymore-wielding, kilted, noble Highland 
savages. 
This process has been matched in Atlantic Canada. Ian McKay in his controversial and 
highly fascinating book ~ ~ Q.[the Folk (1994) sets out to debunk the re-invention 
of the idea of the folk and the impact of antimodernism on culture in Atlantic Canada 
generally and in Nova Scotia specifically. McKay's main point is that in the early part of 
the 20'" century a certain primitive culture and a simple way of life was elevated from being 
scorned and disgusted to being celebrated as romantic life par excellence - thereby creating 
stereotypes and symbols that have only a vague resemblance to real life, but which serve 
Nairn . 1977:155-156. 
Nairn. 1977: 156. This is supported by. among others, Christopher Harvie who describes the process 
of creating this harmJess nalionalism as a 'strategy of noisy inaction' (Harvie, 1994:20). 
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(dis) the purpose of a well-to-do, status quo-nurturing elitelJ A process which is very 
similar to what was seen in Scotland in the late IS'" and early I Cf' centuries: Highland 
culture, which was Gaelic and Catholic, was destroyed only to be re-invented as Lowland 
(and Scottish) Presbyterian culture. The purpose, in Atlantic Canada and Scotland, was the 
construction of a 'harmless' cultural sub-nationalism. To the ruling classes (and probably 
even for the lower classes) there was no better alternative to union/confederation, and thus 
n() need for political nationalism. Even in times of crisis Atlantic Canadians and Scots were 
always relatively well-off and could not afford to jeopardise that by nurturing what would 
in the eyes of most have seemed an irrational and dangerous striving for self-determination. 
F()r a period of about 80 years, the Maritime Provinces needed just look North to be assured 
that they were better off socio-economically being part of the Canadian federation than 
Newfoundland was, not being part of it. 
So much for cultural sub-nationalism and the re-invention of tradition. There are other, 
more tangible, similarities between Scotland and Atlantic Canada: in both regions one finds 
primary and secondary sectors of industry that used to be very prosperous (fisheries, steel 
production, mining, ship-building) but which are now in decline. As a consequence of this, 
one would usually find in both regions high unemployment rates compared to other parts 
of the union . As for Atlantic Canada, according to Finkel, Conrad and Strong-Boag in 
History of the Canadian Peoples. 1867 1Q !ill; Present (1993), 'Unemployment rates 
remained 50 to 100 percent higher [ .. J than elsewhere in the nation' .14 Recent figures from 
Statistics Canada show that today the situation is the same: in December 1997 
ummployment in Newfoundland dropped to 17.5 per cent (down 2.8 per cent from 1996). 
The average unemployment rate in the Atlantic Provinces was 14 per cent whereas the 
average in the rest of Canada was 7.25 per cent. IS 
In the case of Scotland, however, the situation now seems to be changing: since 1992 
unemployment rates in Scotland have closely resembled the average of Great Britain (even 
if certain parts of England can still display unemployment rates that are 1-2 per cent below 
the Scottish rate).16 Nevertheless, the recollection of a not too distant past characterised by 
industrial decline and massive redundancy keeps the Scots focusing along Keynesian lines 
McKay, 1994. 
Finket cl at, 1993:535-36. 
'Unemployme nt rale dip s to seven-year low' in The Globe and Mail, 10 January 1998. 
Brown et al, 1996:83. 
17 
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on social welfare and the creation of jobs as very important issues that ought to be dealt 
with.'" 
In Atlantic Canada, where socio-economic conditions do not seem likely to change for the 
better in the next few years, people generally value social welfare and the creation of jobs 
highly. In a Maclean'slCBC News survey conducted by the end of 1996, 37 per cent of 
Atlantic Canadians felt that unemployment was the most important issue facing Canada 
(compared to an average of 25 per cent for the rest of Canada). Second in importance to 
Atlantic Canadians (but only 5"' to Canadians generally) one finds health care: II per cent 
of Atlantic Canadians considered health care to be the most important issue facing Canada; 
only 6.5 per cent of Canadians outside the Atlantic Provinces agreed. 18 
Despite of the fact that oil and gas has been discovered and is now being extracted in both 
regions, both Scotland and Atlantic Canada have become deeply dependent on state 
subsidies and grants. Hence, in the 1997-98 fiscal year, the block grant received by Scotland 
will be around £14 billion, and, according to Finkel et aI, in the 1980s, half of Atlantic 
Canada's income derived from federal transfer payments. 19 Still, there is new hope in both 
regions of becoming self-supporting through the development of electronic industries, 
tourism, and a larger share ofrevenues from the extraction of natural resources (oil, gas, 
nickel). 
PRAGMATIC REGIONALISM IN SCOTLAND 
Now it has been established that the two regions resemble each other in many respects, both 
socially, economically, culturally and, to a certain extent, constitutionally. However, in this 
analysis the fact that these regions are so much alike only really becomes interesting when 
one starts considering if the demand for further autonomy that can be seen in Scotland 
today is likely to be mirrored in the Atlantic Provinces as well. To be able to answer this 
question , it is necessary once more to turn to Scotland to sketch out some recent 
mentallideological developments there. Since the late 1960s, Scotland has experienced a 
See, among others: Brown et ai, 1996:21-24 and Mitchell, 1996:99-101. 
The Maclean 'sICBC News year-end poll , Maclean's Magazine, 30 December 1996. Decline in the 
quality of social welfare and the high levels of unemployment are issues that also keep occupying 
Atlantic Canadian provincial politicians, who frequently refer to these problems in local media (See 
e.g. 'Nova Scotia still a health care have-not province - Smith', in The Daily Nl?Ws, 27 February 1998). 
The Scottish Office, 1997:4 and Finkel et ai , 1993:503. 
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rise in regionalism with political demands - some (including most Scots) would probably 
refer to this as nationalism. It seems the Scots are now committed to abandoning the just 
mentioned 'cultural sub-nationalism' in favour of a more active role in and attitude towards 
Scottish affairs. A strong indication that this is actually so would be the fact that the Scots 
11 September 1997 voted massively in favour of establishing a Scottish parliament. Also, 
surveys carried out for the Mail on Sunday show that only 13 per cent of the Scots are in 
favour of the constitutional status quo, 40 per cent support devolutionlhome rule within the 
UK and 47 per cent back independence combined with membership of the European Union. 
In addition, 62 per cent believe that Scotland will become independent within 15 years20 
What has made the Scots leave the beaten track and choose a different path from the one 
they used to take? It seems the main reasons should be found in two developments: failure 
on the part of changing British governments to fulfil Scotland' s needs, combined with a 
generally new approach to the idea of the nation-state. 19 years of conservative government, 
Thatcherism, privatisation, poll tax, cuts in the social security budget and, until recently, 
a non-representative British government, characterised by the so-called 'Doomsday 
Scenario' (a popular phrase used to refer to the fact that for almost 20 years Scots have kept 
voting Labour (and SNP) and still getting Conservative governments).21 All this made the 
S cots painfully aware that the prosperous days as part of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain would not last forever, indeed, might already have ended. Very important to Scottish 
nationalist claims has been the discovery of oil in the North Sea off the north-east coast of 
Scotland in the early 1970s, and the fact that most of oil revenues leave Scotland (since the 
discovery of oil, the UK exchequer has received £127 billion from this source)22 
Calculations presented by the Scottish National Party argue that the balance between state 
subsidies and the revenues of what is claimed to be 'Scotland's Oil!'2] has for the last 20 
years been in favour of the Scots. Meaning: if an independent Scotland had had the legal 
say over its own natural resources, Scotland would have a surplus of £80-90 billion and 
would have been fully self-sustaining.24 Or in nationalist terms: Scotland does not need 
Britain, she needs to be in control of her own territory. 
The Mail on SundaylMORI poll, 29 March 1998. 
Sineethe 1979 Generat Etection, the number of Conservative MPs elected in Scotland has been: 21 
(1983), 10 (1987), 1 I (1992) and 0 (1997) out of a totat number of 72 Scottish MPs. 
Heald & Geaughan, t996:170. 
Last part of an SNP catch phrase: 'It 's Scotland's Oil ', developed for the two very successful generat 
election campaigns in 1974 (7 MPs elected for the SNP in the fIrst general election, 11 in the second). 
http ://www.snp.org.uklIibrary/rr96 1018.html. 
" 
That, combined with a mllch more pragmatic view of Scotland in a changing, globalising 
world (with e.g. a Europe o/the Regions), may very well have been decisive in maturing 
the Scots for political demands for an increased say in own affairs and the serious 
consideration of alternatives to the UK that is now the order of the day - for pragmatic 
regionalism. 
As indicated in the above definition of pragmatic regionalism, the purpose of this is not to 
argue that the Scots generally go for full independence - in fact most Scots would probably 
oppose that. But indications are strong that the Scots have found a new self, freed from old 
'safe' images of the cultural sub-nationalism. Instead, there is a new and much more 
pragmatic conception of what Scotland will have to put up with from Westminster, and of 
the alternatives to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland if this stale 
fails to provide. The alternative, of course, being another supra-regional entity (which 
happens also to be a supra-national entity): the European Union." Perhaps the best proof 
that the Scots have really begun thinking of alternatives to the British union is the fact that 
the New Labour government, in the words of Tony Blair, has to give the Scots their own 
parliament for 'the Union [tol be strengthened and the threat of separatism removed' .26 
PRECONDITIONS FOR PRAGMATIC REGIONALISM IN ATLANTIC CANADA 
Let LIS tum now to Atlantic Canada in an attempt to extend the previous cultural, social, 
economic and constitutional comparisons and see if similar preconditions for the 
development of mental/ideological processes resembling those in Scotland can be traced 
in the Atlantic Provinces. Some of them, it shows, actually can: In Atlantic Canada one sees 
a rising unemployment rate, and yet a governmenl that keeps imposing tougher restrictions 
on unemployment insurance benefits . Atlantic Canada also has its own Doomsday 
Scenario: as used to be the case in Scotland, the Atlantic Provinces are poorly represented 
in government - after tlhe federal election in June 1997, Canada is run by the Liberals who 
won only 1/3 of the seats in the Atlantic Provinces. There is a continuing crisis in the social 
infrastructure of the Atlantic Provinces, and even a Canadian equivalent to the much·hated 
poll tax imposed on the Scots: the Blended Sales Tax (BST). The BST, a I5-per·cenl sales 
The catch-phrase of the Scottish National Party: Independence in Europe, indicates that even Scottish 
nationalists do not see full independence and the acquisition of a sovereign state in the Westpllalian 
sense as a likely future prospect for Scotland. Membership of the European Union, on the other band, 
with an increased say in internal affairs, compared to UK membership , seems a much more likely 
outcome, 
'Real Power wilt stay with MPs in England, Blair telts Scotland ', The Scotsman, 4 April 1997. 
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tax which took effect I April 1997, is generally opposed by Atlantic Canadians because 
they, as the Canadians with the lowest average income, have been particularly hurt by it." 
As in Scotland, there is a sense of not being given a fair deal on oil and gas revenues from 
the extensive Hibernia and Terra Nova (Newfoundland) oil fields and the Sabel (Nova 
Scotia) gas field in the Atlantic ocean off the coast of Atlantic Canada. In Nova Scotia it 
was recently revealed that 70 per cent of the Sable gas revenues will be transferred back to 
Ottawa as payment for previous grants to the province.2s In Newfoundland, dissatisfaction 
w ith the efforts of the current government to increase the province's revenues from natural 
reSOUl'ces has led to the creation of a new political party, the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Pany, the aim of which is to bring all Newfoundland and Labrador natural resources under 
the control of the province itself." 
25 February 1998, Finance Minister Paul Martin and the Liberal federal government 
presented its anxiously awaited 1998 budget, including a distribution of the fiscal dividend, 
that Canada ex periences for the first time in twenty years, to different government programs 
and initiatives. Even if the budget includes tax relieves for low-income families and 
increased spending on education at all levels (both would benefit most Atlantic Canadians), 
i~ was not particularly well-received in Atlantic Canada. The reasons vary: it has been 
argued that the tax. relieves provided are merely the removal of taxes introduced to fight the 
defici t in the first place. Neither was there any mention of increased spending on health 
care. Eut most importantly, none of the fiscal surplus is to be used for increased spending 
e>n unemployment programs and the creation of jobs. The introduction of a successor to The 
Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS), due to expire this summer, was anxiously awaited -
mainly in Newfoundland where 24,000 people rely heavily upon the continued existence 
<> f this or a similar program - but none was offered.)O 
'NDP says it would ditch SST' , The Daily Ni?Ws, 18 February 1998. 
'Deal ups Sabte royalties ' . The Halifax Herald Limited, t7 December 1997 . 
'Time is now to turn things around, warns teader of new political party' , The Evening Telegram, 2 
January 1998. 
'TAGS follow in the works', The Evening Telegram, 27 February 1998; 'Just not enough', The 
Evening Telegram, 27 February 1998; 'Mixed Allantic reviews for budget' , The Evening Telegram , 
27 February 1998; 'The Federal Budget', The Globe and Mail, 25 February 1998. 
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Attempts made by the federal government to better socio-economic conditions and the 
quality of life in Atlantic Canada 
Serious attempts at reviving Atlantic Canadian industry and at attracting investment to that 
less fortunate region of Canada have previously been launched by most federal 
governments in co-operation with Atlantic Canadian provincial governments. Both in the 
form of locally managed forums for the discussion of possible solutions and future areas 
of investment, and in the form of federally managed economic support programs. Some 
have been fairly successful, some have failed miserably and some have still to prove their 
value. 
During the Diefenbaker administration, initiatives such as the Atlantic Provinces 
Adjustment Grants and the Atlantic Development Board indicated a renewed concern for 
economic development in the easternmost part of Canada.31 Today the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA), a federal Crown corporation the goal of which is to 
improve the economy in Atlantic Canada generally through the development of business 
and job opportunities by inter alia marketing the Atlantic Provinces internationally and 
through distributing grants and loans, has been fairly successful but nevertheless seems 
inadequate to cope with the extensive economic problems facing Atlantic Canada32 
In 1969. during the Trudeau government, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion 
(DREE) was established to co-ordinate all the existing regional development programs. The 
goal was through subsidies to have companies invest and start new production in low 
development areas. After a period of relative success, the following lack of results led to 
the abolition of the department.33 
The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) - a program introduced in 1992 to help fishers 
cope with the socio-economic consequences of over-fishing, when groundfish stocks 
collapsed and a moratorium on cod fishing was announced - should, according to the 
Canadian Auditor General, Denis Desaults , be considered a failure. After $2 billion have 
been spent, fishing fleets are still too large, and what should have been a program for 
Finkel et al . t 993:534. 
http ://www.ncaa.ca!. 
Finkel et al . 1993:534: Krueger, 1982:76-7. 
34 
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restructuring the fishing industry and re-educating fishers and processing workers has 
become 'an income support program' .34 
Atlantic Canada is very dependent on money transfers from Ottawa to sustain a certain 
standard of living, however low. This has already been established in the above. Even if 
new industries may slowly be starting to payoff, a time when the region becomes self-
sustaining seems to be in a remote future . Just as Scottish pragmatic regionalists rely on the 
European Union, oil, the IT and tourism industries - using these as arguments why Scotland 
should and even could have a larger say in own affairs and perhaps even one day leave the 
UK - any Atlantic Canadian pragmatic regionalists would need to have a serious alternative 
to the present geopolitical situation. 
Any alternatives? 
In the - still quite unimaginable - case of full-b lown Atlantic Canadian separatism, where 
should the Atlantic Provinces go? Even together, as one 'Atlantic Union', they would not 
be able to make a voice for themselves in the global economy. So are there any alternative 
prospects? It would appear that there is at least one: the United States of America. This is 
an alternative which has not so far proved really attractive to the Atlantic Provinces. The 
main reason may well be that Canada was always perceived to be the more socially 
respons ible state - and to a region with as many social problems as Atlantic Canada that 
is worth a lot. But because of federal Canadian economic cutbacks in the 1980s and 1990s 
affecting education, Medicare, unemployment insurance benefits, old age security payments 
etc.," it seems that the gap between the American and Canadian social systems is 
narrowing. In addition, it seems there is a widespread feeling in Atlantic Canada that the 
success of the Liberal Party in defeating Canada's deficit is mainly achieved by destroying 
the social infrastructure of Atlantic Canada.36 Hence, it appears that the main socio-
economic incitement to stay within the Canadian federation is gradually being removed, 
making annexation to the U.S. a much less dreaded alternative. 
'Watchdog calls TAGS lifeline a $2-billion flop' . The Halifax Herald Limited, 8 October 1997, and 
http://www.gov.nf.ca/publicavtags/. 
Finkel et aI , 1993:572-579. 
'MP, blasted for social cuts ', The Daily NlMs, 22 October 1997; 'How we'd spend our federal 
surplus ', The Globe and Mail, 7 February 1998; 'The Globe and Mail/Angus Reid Poll' , The Globe 
and Mail, I November 1997. 
It should also be taken into consideration that the Atlantic Provinces are already in dose 
economic and political co-operation with the New England states - through e.g., the AImual 
Conference of the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers - and that foI:' 
historical and geographical reasons Atlantic Canadians may have much more in corrunon , 
culturally, with people from Maine or New Hampshire than they have with e.g. Britiso. 
Colurnbians. 
A second alternative could be argued to exist: the North American Free Trade Agreement: 
(NAFT A), the membership of which could be imagined to make up for the loss of federal 
Canadian money transfers . 
From a different point of view, what might appear to be the only two serious alternatives 
to Canada for the Atlantic Provinces - the USA and the NAFTA - may not really be 
alternatives. Firstly, the USA would have no economic interest whatsoever in letting in four 
provinces with a combined population of 2 million people and severe economic and social 
problems. Secondly, the NAFT A is a completely different 'union' from both federal Canada. 
and the European Union, not focussing on social and political co-operation. Even if the 
Atlantic Provinces would only be needing the economic benefits that membership of the 
NAFT A would bring and no political unit apart from, say, an Atlantic union of some lkind, 
they should not, in the first place, rely too heavily on becoming members of the NAFTA. 
Previously, both American and Canadian administrations have told Quebec nationalists that 
in the event of Quebec secession, the fornner province of Canada should not expect 10 be 
admitted to the NAFTA. It is difficult to imagine the Atlantic Provinces getting a better 
deal. 
PRAGMATIC REGIONALISM IN ATLANTIC CANADA? 
In 1968, in an address to the Atlantic Conference, the then Minister of the DREE, Jean 
Marchand, said: 
'If the underdevelopment of the Atlantic Provinces is not corrected - not by chari ty or 
subsidies but by helping them become areas of economic growth - then the unity ~f the 
country is almost as surely destroyed as it would be by the French-English confrontation'.37 
As quoted in The Atlantic Economy, Fifth Annual Review, Atlantic Provinces Economic Co-uncll , 
1971 p. IS (Kruger, 1982:73). 
The underdevelopment of the Atlantic Provinces referred to by Marchand clearly has not 
been adequately dealt with. In the following, first arguments in favour of, then arguments 
against the change in Atlantic Canadian mentality and attitude towards the Federal 
Canadian State. that Marchand predicted in 1968, will be presented. 
Arguments in favour of the existence or imminent development of pragmatic 
regionalism 
First of all, the federal election in June 1997 indicated a radical change in attitude towards 
federal political parties. In the 1993 federal election, the Liberals swept the Atlantic 
Provinces, loosing just one seat to the Progressive Conservatives. In the 1997 federal 
election they only got II seats out of 32. Traditionally, 3'd parties have not had any support 
at all in Atlantic Canada, now suddenly the New Democratic Party (NDP) got 8 seats." If 
nothing else, this is an expression of the determination to effect political changes among 
Atlantic Canadian voters who, in the words of Finkel, Conrad and Strong-Boag, used to be 
'the most cynical of Canadian voters,.39 Finkel et al continue: 'They neither expected their 
politicians to represent them effectively, nor did they believe in their own ability to effect 
change through the political process. In the face of such cynicism, Atlantic Canadians were 
less likely to throw their energies into political reform'."" In other words, the fact that there 
has been a change in the voting patterns in the Atlantic Provinces might indicate that there 
is a new belief in the possibility of changing the current political and socio-economic 
situation. And maybe, as a consequence, a determination towards bettering the current 
socio·economic situation through radical change. Pragmatic regionalism would fulfil such 
a wish for radical change without jeopardising the state of things entirely. 
Another indication that the Atlantic Provinces could be turning towards pragmatic 
regionalism may be found in polls conducted for Maclean's Magazine. One of the questions 
put to Canadians in the 1990 and 1994 polls was: 'Do you think of yourself as a Canadian 
first, or as a resident of a particular region or province? .. 1 
39 
'Election 97 , How the parties fared ', The Globe and Mail, 4 June t 997. 
Finkel el aI , 1993:572. 
Ibid. 
It should be mentioned that the question was phrased slightly different in the 1990 poll CDo you think 
o/yourself as 0 Canadianjirsl, or as a citizen o[your province? ' and that the figures in it are rounded 
percentages . Nevertheless the question carried the same meaning and the results thus still provides a 
valid result for comparison. 
I 
Table 1 
Percentage who identifY Percentage who identify 
with their own province: themselves as 'Canadian ': 
1990 1994 1990 1994 
Quebec 55 49 Quebec 44 45 
NeMfoundl 53 57 Newfoundl. 47 39 
P. E Island 43 44 P. E. Island 57 50 
Nova SCalia 37 27 Nova Scotia 63 69 
New Brunsw. 25 26 New Brunsw. 75 64 
Alberta 24 16 Alberta 74 74 
Br. Columbia 17 17 Br. Columbia 83 76 
Saskatch. 16 7 Saskatch. 83 82 
Manitoba 15 11 Manitoba 84 77 
Ontario 9 9 Ontario 90 90 
Sources: Maclean 's 1 January, 1990:2 and Maclean 's 3 January, 1994. oJ) 
It is obvious from the results reproduced in table I that respondents from Atlantic Canada 
along with respondents from Quebec are those who identify the least as Canadians. It is 
equally obvious that in the space of time between the two polls Nova Scotia has been 
heading in the opposite direction of the rest of the Maritime Provinces. That is, whereas 
people in Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Newfoundland define themselves 
increasingly in relation to their province (up I, I and 4 percent, respectively) and less as 
Canadians (down 7, 11 and 8 per cent respectively), Nova Scotians define themselves 
increasingly as Canadians (up 6 per cent) -less as Nova Scotians (down 10 per cent). 
Thus, the results seem to oppose the idea of a renewed sense of regional identity in Atlantic 
Canada · even if the phrase 'region' in the question asked by Maclean's Magazine never 
receives any proper consideration in the reproduction of the results of the survey. Regional 
identity may in fact prove the really interesting part of such a poll. Opposing this conclusion 
based on what is apparently the ever less regional identity of Nova Scotians, however, is 
the assumption that a renewed sense of region among Atlantic Canadians may be 
'An Uncertain Nation' , Maclean 's Magazine I January 1990. 
'Ho\\' we differ ', Maclean's Magazine I January 1994. 
... , 
... , 
strengthened by the increased political and economic co-operation between the Atlantic 
Provinces. 
Frank McKenna, until recently the premier of New Brunswick, has been arguing in favour 
of a Maritime common market, and APEC (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council _ 
organised by private enterprise) and CMP (Council of Maritime Premiers) are already well-
established institutions.44 In this respect it is worth keeping in mind that it was as recently 
as 1964 that the then premier of New Brunswick, Louis Robichaud addressed the 
Charlottetown conference this way: 
'The New Brunswick delegation came to Charlottetown in 1864 for the 
ostensible purpose of fabricating a Maritime Union, in concert with the then 
colonies of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Unfortunately (and I use the 
word advisedly), they were not resolute in their purpose. I am persuaded that, 
had such a political or legislative union been consummated at the time, our 
contribution to the strength of and our benefits from nationhood would have 
multiplied manyfold [ .. ] Perhaps [ .. ) Premiers Stansfield [Nova Scotia), 
Smallwood [Newfoundland] and Shaw [Prince Edward Island) and I may get 
together today and [ .. ] decide to reduce the number of Canadian provinces from 
ten to seven. Should that occur, the focal point of progress and activity in the 
nation would unquestionably and rapidly take a marked shift to the east':5 
At a recent meeting between Atlantic Canadian premiers, a similar question was debated. 
It was argued by business groups that too much administration burdens Atlantic Canada 
(four provincial governments for about two million people) and that some kind of economic 
union might be the best solution to the problem." All premiers rejected the idea in the form 
presented because it would involve a political as well as an economic union. Nevertheless, 
it seems the idea of an Atlantic Union of some kind is back on the agenda. 
Apart from poor representation, the BST, a renewed sense of region etc., there are other 
external developments that may pull the Atlantic Provinces in a regionalist or perhaps even 
separatist direction: One is the unrest created by Quebec and Western Canada rattling the 
separatist sabre. What may be disturbing Atlantic Canadians the most in this respect is the 
Feehan, 1993:133-144 . 
MacKirdy el ai, 1971 :206. 
'Economic freedom sought' , The Halifax Herald Limited, 6 October 1997, and 'Atlantic vision 
clouded by differing views' , The Daily News, 10 October 1997. 
" 
fact that if Quebec secedes, Atlantic Canada will be physically isolated from the rest of 
Anglophone Canada. A second external factor is, as mentioned, the mental consequerrces 
of globalisation. If nation states are actually starting to lose their sacredness and pragmatic 
regionalism is becoming the order of the day, this will not work in favour of Canadian 
national unity either. 
Arguments against the existence or imminent development of pragmatic regionalism 
First of all, no united Atlantic Canadian regional identity seems to exist. There would be 
some reason in referring to a Maritime culture, but not to a Maritime identity (the two 
should not be confused). Furthermore, Newfoundland and Labrador (which only joined 
Canada in 1949) has a different heritage, culture and, indeed, identity than the rest of 
Atlantic Canada. This would present a main obstacle to the development of anything 
beyond an economic union between the Atlantic Provinces - at least in a nearby future. 
Secondly, Atlantic Canadian politicians appear to be too committed to federalism to assist 
in the creation of any pragmatic regionalism. Provincial government web-sites on the 
Internet testify to this: Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and New Brunswick all have a certain 
site dedicated to the promotion of national unity.47 
Also, Atlantic Canadians have traditionally supported the multicultural idea of Canada 
(indicated e.g. by the support for the Meech Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Accord, and 
now the Calgary Declaration)." The very same figures from Maclean's, which in the above 
were argued to indicate a growing dis-identification with Canada, still show that 
approximately half the Atlantic Canadians identify themselves as Canadian first. Thus, the 
polls conducted for the Maclean's Magazine prove to be anything but unambiguous. These 
figures provide no certain indication that Atlantic Canadians are turning their backs on the 
Canadian federation in favour of their own region - indeed, the figures for Nova Scotia may 
point (0 the exact opposite conclusion. From its very beginning, one of the main ideas of 
Canadian federation was multiculturalism (a 'mosaic ' compared to the American 'melting 
pot'). Canadians were never expected to identify first and foremost as Canadian nationals. 
NS: hUp:llgov.ns.callegilunite/whycare.htm, NF: http://public.gov.nf.calcurrentevents lunity/-
unityqa·.htm, NB: http://www.gov.nb.calunitelindex.htm. 
In a national poll, the Angus Reid Group found that 79 per cent of Atlantic Canadians support the 
CaJgary Declaration (opposed to 62 per cent in Quebec and an average of72 per cent for the rest of 
the provinces) (,Premiers' unity packet backed ', TheG/abe and Mail, I October, 1997.) 
The point is that even if people do not identify as Canadians, they may still identify with 
the idea of Canada. 
In the 1997 federal election, Atlantic Canadians used their democratic right to oust the 
Liberals, sending a signal saying 'change'. The fact that Atlantic Canadians chose to protest 
this way could indicate - as is done in the above - that Atlantic Canadians are ready for 
radical changes to take place, both mentally and politically. But at the same time this could 
also indicate that the 'cynicism' that Finkel, Conrad and Strong-Boag refer to is no longer 
part of Atlantic Canadian mentality. This then would indicate that what was interpreted 
abo ve as Atlantic Canadian determinism in relation to increased pragmatic regionalism 
might also be interpreted as Atlantic Canadian determinism in relation to what could then 
be termed 'pragmatic federalism' - a stake on the present political and economical 
structures, but with different federal politicians in control of them. 
As mentioned above, there is widespread support for the Calgary declaration on national 
unity in all the Atlantic Provinces. Still, according to the Maclean's poll, compared to other 
regions in Canada, one still finds the lowest levels of identification with Canada in the 
Atlantic Provinces; it would appear there is a paradox involved in this: Atlantic Canadians 
are both the ones who favour national unity the most and the ones who identify the least as 
Canadians. Again, one explanation could be that pragmatic federalism, not pragmatic 
regionalism, is what characterises Atlantic Canada. In other words: even if Atlantic 
Canadians may not feel particularly 'Canadian', they still opt for the economic and social 
security found within a strong Canadian federation , as opposed to the less safe prospects 
offered by pragmatic regionalism. 
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS 
These were the arguments in favour of and the arguments against the existence of the 
imm inent development of pragmatic regionalism in Atlantic Canada. Judging from these 
arguments, has cultural sub-nationalism in Atlantic Canada been replaced by pragmatic 
regionalism, then? Hardly. The sum of the above arguments would seem to indicate that 
Atlantic Canada does not at this point possess a very developed regional identity; more 
likely pragmatic federalism than pragmatic regionalism exists here. 
The next point of interest then is the direction that the Atlantic Provinces may now be 
heading in. One can imagine four possible paths for the Atlantic Canadians to follow from 
here: a) to become increasingly 'Canadian', developing a Canadian nationalism, b) keep 
being pragmatic federalists , c) tum pragmatic regionalists or d) become separatists optin.g 
for Atlantic Canadian secession. 
For obvious reasons neither Canadian nationalism nor secession seem even remotely 
plausible directions for Atlantic Canadians to be heading in at this point. However, if one 
accepts the existence of such a continuum - from Canadian nationalism over pragmatic 
federalism, over pragmatic regionalism to secession - using socio-economics as a guideline, 
the most likely direction for Atlantic Canadians to go (perhaps excluding Nova Scotia) is 
towards pragmatic regionalism. In the above, Atlantic Canada has been proven to be the 
socio-economic laggard of Canada without much hope of changing this position. The well-
tried, but obviously not very successful pragmatic federalism, does not appear to be the 
logical outcome for people in that position. 
The figures in table I can be seen as supporting this ; the figures still seem to indicate that 
discontent in the Atlantic region is increasing and that Atlantic Canadians (with th.e 
exception of Nova Scotians) define themselves as ever less Canadian. It can not be 
incidental that Quebec (where approximately 50 per cent of the population support Quebec 
independence)'· and the Atlantic provinces divide the 'top five'-positions among them. 
The process from pragmatic federali sm over pragmatic regionalism to Atlantic Canadia:n 
secession (however unlikely at this moment) is ajoumey which Atlantic Canada could very 
soon be starting upon and one which federal Canada would not want to be encouraging. 
Returning to Scotland for possible answers, we find that in the 1960s no one thought 
Scotland would ever let go of the 'safe' cultural sub-nationalism that had characterise<1 
Scottish culture/mentality for more than 200 years. Ten years later pragmatic regionalism 
flourished because circumstances had changed. Then again in the aftermath of the 1979 
referendum Scottish pragmatic regionalism seemed all but disappeared and (pragmatic) 
unionism the way of the future. Nevertheless, today after almost 20 years of neglect almost 
50 per cent of all Scots are in favour of independence. The case of Scotland thus proves that 
the mental change from cultural sub-nationalism and pragmatic unionism/federalism t() 
pragmatic regionalism or even separatism may occur within a very short span of time if 
certain crucial demands are not met. 
Pragmatic regionalism because of its nature (of not focusing on emotional matters such as 
images of self and myths to the same degree as do e.g. most nationalisms) can easily be 
In the referendum 30 November 1995, 49.4 per cent 01 the Quebecois voted in favor of an 
independent Quebec CDagen, der rystede Canada', Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, I November 
t 995). 
niIJped in the bud. In the case of Atlantic Canada, it would appear that the federal 'scissors' 
should be economic development resulting in generally improved socio-economic 
conditions.;o 
With what seems a generally changing idea of the sacredness of the nation-state in mind, 
it seems a good idea that the Canadian federal government and Finance Minister Paul 
Martin, who should now be considering what to do with next year's fiscal dividend, should 
decide on spending some of the federal economic surplus in re-developing the social 
infrastructure in the four have-not provinces of Canada and in creating Atlantic Canadian 
jobs. Especially since official Canada has always had a hard time creating the sacredness 
that nations and nation-states have had 'by nature' because of the relative cultural 
homogeneity of their nationals, and which has been (at least partly) achieved by other 
multicultural federations - such as e.g. the USA. 
The opposing argument goes: multiculturalism itself is the 'Canadian Way' or the 'Idea of 
Canada', the shared socia-cultural identity and what Canadians have always taken pride in. 
Still, today a renewed focus on ethnicity is breaking up old multicultural states (examples 
w(Juld be fonner USSR, former Yugoslavia), leaving others tottering. In Canada 
specifically, the Quebec question indicates that multiculturalism may not be every 
Canadian's idea of the perfect society. But most importantly: It becomes almost impossible 
to maintain the illusion of a shared socio-cultural identity when there is an obvious uneven 
spread of both culture (different myths and practices) and social standards. Canada is one 
of the richest states in the world, but fails to deal with the fact that wealth in Canada is 
unevenly distributed. Atlan tic Canada has been - and appears to continue to be - lagging 
behind in almost every area of socio-economics compared to the rest of Canada. 
It is certainly true, as Ulf Hedetoft recently stated, that 'National identity as a horizontal 
It may seem that by characterising the ongoing development as it is done in the above, one must also 
attribute to Scots and Atlantic Canadians cynical motives and attitudes. But these motives should not 
be perceived as panicularly cynical. As mentioned, 'pragmatic' covers much better the new approach 
to nation state, region and self. The world perhaps should not be naturally divided into nation states, 
and regions not condemned for trying to cut a better deal for themselves. After all, the currently 
dominating idea of the nation and of nation states is not very old. At best it was invented during the 
European Enlightenment and developed during the Romantic period. Therefore, referring to Scottish 
and perhaps Atlantic pragmatic regionalism as cynical, would be to agree with a primordialist view 
of nations and nation states as the only true way of organising the world. 
Still, it should be pointed out that in spite of the new and generally more pragmatic attitude towards 
the nation-state which is developing, some nation-states do and should in fact continue to playa very 
important role. Hence, in the case of Scotland, cultural sub-nationalism might have remained the only 
indication of a different culture and a sense of imagined community in the Northern part of Britain. 
But mainly because of indifference on the part of Conservative British governments to regional 
problems, it didn'!. 
51 
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"imagined community" ( .. J to the ideal-type national citizen goes well beyond pragmatic 
arrangements that can be replaced at will' .'1 The question that must be put though is: are 
Atlantic Canadians 'ideal-type national citizens'? Where states are culturally homogeneous, 
social inequality may be accepted if not too extreme. The existence of the 'imagined 
community,S2 is still possible because 'have-not' regions know they are (or believe 
themselves to be) sharing what is perceived to be the most important elements of all ""ith 
the 'have' regions: beliefs, myths, culture. There is a faith in the common destiny of the 
society. 
But some states (including Canada) do not have the benefit, not even the illusion, of a 
single unifying culture - using Friedrich Meinecke's terminology, Canada would be a 
'Staatsnation', but not a 'Kultumation'S3 - and thus the 'have-not' regions within these 
states much sooner start questioning the reason in accepting inequality. This argument was 
advanced already in 1968 by the former Prime Minister of Canada, L. B. Pearson: 
'The economic prospects of Canadians of certain regions remain more limited 
than those of people in other regions ( .. J Only through (aJ sense of equality -
equality in the opportunities open to all Canadians ( .. J can we give a purpose 
to Canada that will meet the proper expectations of our people. And only 
through measures that will carry this conviction - that we intend to make 
equality of opportunity an achievement as well as a goal- can we preserve the 
unity of the country, 54 
The leader of the NOP, Alexa McDonough, who is a centralist but also an Atlantic 
Canadian , seems to be viewing unity as secondary to socio-economics. Being very 
pragmatic about this, she said in an interview on 11 September (inspired perhaps by the 
Scottish referendum which was scheduled for the same day): 'You can't force, through a 
Constitution, to make people want to be part of a country ( .. J People want to be part of a 
country that has a healthy economy' 5S 
Hedelofl, 1997 :6. 
As defined by Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1983:6). 
Smith , 1991 :8. 
As quoted in The Allantic Economy, Fifth Annual Review, Atlantic Provinces Economic C Oil neil, 
1971 , p.1S (Krueger, 1982:72). 
'Jobs first , McDonough says ', The Daily News 12 September 1997. By 'healthy ecooomy' 
McDonough is clearly referring Lo the subject of the interview: jobs and social programs. 
Up until this point, the idea of a Canadian imagined community - the multicultural nation -
has provided Atlantic Canadians with their most important focus for identification. In fact , 
Ihis may be the point on which Scotland and Atlantic Canada differ mentally and 
ideologically, and the reason why the two regions may end up following different paths. 
Since Enlightenment thinkers gave up on the idea of Scotland as North Britain,56 there have 
been only brief periods (during the World Wars and, perhaps, the Falkland Crisis) when the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain was perceived as one nation with one national identity. 
Contrary to the situation in Great Britain, today there is still reason in arguing that there is 
in fact one shared Canadian national identity. 
At least as things stand now, it looks as if Atlantic Canadians generally are willing to renew 
their social 'contract' with the Canadian federation and to keep investing their allegiance 
with the Canadian state. But the 'Idea of Canada' will only pull so far. Unless supported 
by tangible efforts, things may start to change. Thus, it is easily predicted that unless the 
federal Canadian government manages to deal with the socia-economic problems of the 
Atlal1tic region in a proper manner - not simply through increased grants which will 
inevitably bring increased dependence on Ottawa, but more likely in the form of increased 
devolutiol1 of political power and thus a higher degree of autonomy in economic matters -
it m ay be difficult in the future to convince Atlantic Canadians that they need not look for 
an alternati ve to Canada. 
Lynch, 1992:343-4. 
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